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Abstract
This study compares the spatial positioning of over 200 political parties across 28 European Union (EU) member states in
two cross-national voting advice applications (VAAs) developed for the 2014 European elections: EUvox and euandi. We
find that the two VAAs show highly similar results in terms of party positioning on the cultural liberal-conservative and
pro-anti EU dimensions, while economic left–right placements converge less, especially concerning right-wing parties. Our
analyses reveal that the higher overlap on the cultural and EU dimensions is a result, at least partially, of the inclusion of
similar items used to measure these concepts, while most of the systematic divergence between the two VAAs in left–
right placements stems from problematic issue-statements used in the dimensional calculations. We demonstrate how
certain items can cause bias in the placements of specific party families by (1) not aligning with other statements that
measure the same latent construct; (2) tapping into other latent constructs, in addition to the one they are supposed to
measure; and (3) not inducing sufficient polarization between parties.
Keywords
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Introduction
As voting advice applications (VAAs) appear in more and
more electoral contexts and their usage is on the rise, the
quality of such online platforms has increasingly become
the focus of academic interest and scrutiny (Cedroni and
Garzia, 2010; Garzia and Marschall, 2014; Kleinnijenhuis
et al., 2017; Wall et al., 2014). While initially VAAs pro-
vided simple agreement scores between voters and parties,
during the last decade, a new generation of VAAs has
emerged; the latter attach issue-statements to the deeper
lying divisions or cleavages of the political system and
generate low-dimensional spatial maps on which voters and
parties/candidates are positioned (Garzia and Marschall,
2012; Krouwel and Wall, 2014). By placing political
parties on overarching political dimensions, such as
socio-economic left–right or cultural liberal–conservative,
VAAs partake in the same endeavour as other more con-
ventional methods of party positioning like manifesto
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coding, expert surveys and public opinion aggregation (see
Krouwel, 2012; Krouwel and van Elfrinkhof, 2014; Marks,
2007). As we still lack a so-called ‘gold standard’ of party
positioning (Garzia et al., 2017; Pennings, 2011), it is
important to study the strengths and weaknesses of the
VAA method and outline possibilities to improve the qual-
ity of party placement in VAAs.
As Garzia and Marschall (2012: 214) contend, the ‘party
dimension’ of VAA research remains largely unexplored,
since most scholars focus on analysing user data. This is
likely because most national VAAs include no more than
five to ten parties which is insufficient to adequately assess
the quality of party positioning using statistical methods
(Germann et al., 2015). Thus, although there have been some
articles that compare the VAA estimates of party positions
with other methods of party placement (see Gemenis, 2013;
Wagner and Ruusuvirta, 2012), there is a lack of studies that
compare the positions of the same political parties at the same
point of time in different VAAs. This is a significant gap, as it
is problematic to evaluate the reliability of the VAA method
of party positioning if we do not know whether different
VAAs locate the same parties similarly in the political space.
VAAs developed for cross-national elections, like the ones
for the European Parliament (EP), can remedy this problem,
as they generate large data sets on the policy positions of
political parties valuable for comparative party research.
The goal of this study is to address this gap and compare
party positioning in the low-dimensional political space in
cross-national VAAs. We use the party position data of two
pan-European VAAs developed prior to the 2014 EP elec-
tions: EUvox1 and euandi.2 As both VAAs use the same
three-dimensional spatial model comprised of ‘left–right’,
‘liberal–conservative/traditionalist’ and ‘pro–anti-
European Union’ dimensions, these cross-national data sets
provide a unique opportunity to compare the positioning of
over 200 political parties across the European Union (EU).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the most large-scale
comparison of VAA party placements that has been con-
ducted so far. Our study is exploratory in its nature – we
analyse the results that the comparison of the two data sets
reveals, without setting a priori expectations. We compare
the aggregate party placements of both data sets and ana-
lyse the differences in party positioning across various
party families to determine whether the positioning of par-
ties belonging to certain groups diverges to a greater extent.
In addition to comparing, we also seek to explain the
(in)consistencies between the party positions in EUvox and
euandi. We focus on the element deemed the most crucial
part of any VAA – the issue-statements (Garzia et al., 2017;
Louwerse and Otjes, 2012; Van Camp et al., 2014). The
way statements are selected, formulated and assigned to
dimensions is decisive for the correct party placement in
a low-dimensional political space, as answers to the state-
ments are used for calculating the spatial positions (Ger-
mann et al., 2015; Otjes and Louwerse, 2014). Thus, any
notable divergence between the party placements is likely
to be caused by suboptimal statements in one or both of the
studied VAAs. However, the main aim of the article is to
evaluate how similar the party placements in EUvox and
euandi are, and, subsequently, explain the findings. We will
not provide a detailed analysis of every single issue-
statement, but rather concentrate on the problematic items
that are possibly causing placement divergence between the
two VAAs. Therefore, this article should be considered a
general comparison of two party data sets, not an exhaus-
tive judgement on the reliability and validity of all three
ideological scales in both applications.
Low-dimensional spatial models, party
placement methodology and statement
selection in VAAs
The most widely used spatial framework in VAAs is the
two-dimensional model consisting of socio-economic and
cultural axes (Germann et al., 2015; Louwerse and Otjes,
2014). This corresponds to the main findings of party sys-
tem research from the last few decades: Although Downs
(1957) – the pioneer of party system spatial modelling –
distributed parties on a single left–right axis, more recent
studies have shown that the left–right dimension, based on
the extent of state intervention in the economy, is cross-cut
by a cultural liberal-conservative dimension that deals with
issues related to moral values (Kitschelt and McGann,
1997; Kriesi et al., 2008). This cultural axis has often been
referred to as a Green/Alternative/Libertarian (GAL) – Tra-
ditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist (TAN) dimension
(Hooghe et al., 2002). We will use the terms ‘GAL-TAN’,
‘cultural’ and ‘liberal-conservative/traditional’ dimension
interchangeably in this article, as the exact wording often
varies among different authors and VAAs.3 The VAAs
under review in this article also include a third dimension:
A pro/anti-European (Union) integration axis related to the
nature of the electoral competition for which these VAAs
were designed – the EP elections.
The way VAAs estimate party positions on the previ-
ously described latent ideological dimensions is rather dif-
ferent from other methods of party placement. VAAs use an
indirect approach, as they place parties on a number of
issues considered partial indicators of each policy dimen-
sion (Gemenis, 2013). On these issues, parties are posi-
tioned on the basis of their perceived (dis)agreement with
the proposed statement. Some VAAs use a simple three-
point agree/disagree/neutral answer pattern, whereas more
elaborate ones employ five-point Likert-type scales which
capture not just the (dis)agreement with any specific pro-
position, but also the degree of (dis)agreement (Garzia and
Marschall, 2012). The parties’ dimensional positions sig-
nify their average aggregate scores on all items assigned to
the respective dimension. This method was developed by
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the Dutch Kieskompas in 2006 (see Kleinnijenhuis et al.,
2007) and has been subsequently applied to many other
VAAs (Trechsel and Mair, 2011), including the two we
compare in this study.
There are certain differences among VAAs regarding
the procedure of coding the party positions on the issues
that are chosen to indicate the ideological dimensions.
Although some VAAs let parties determine their own posi-
tions without any scrutiny (Garzia and Marschall, 2012),
most of them also rely on the input of experts. The so-called
Kieskompas method combines the two approaches, as the
party self-placements are reviewed and – if necessary –
corrected by experts who use parties’ election manifestos,
other campaign material or the speeches and media appear-
ances of their leaders to validate party positions (Krouwel
et al., 2012; Trechsel and Mair, 2011). The Delphi method
relies exclusively on expert judgements (Garzia and
Marschall, 2012) and uses the process of ‘structured beha-
vioural aggregation’ to reach consensus over party posi-
tions among a panel of experts (Gemenis, 2015).
Regardless of the way in which the party positions are
coded or the dimensions of the political space defined, the
selection of issue-statements has a decisive impact on the
resulting VAA spatial maps (Garzia et al., 2017; Lefevere
and Walgrave, 2014; Louwerse and Rosema, 2014; Walgrave
et al., 2009). Party placements on the ideological dimensions
are derived from aggregate positions on single issue-
statements; thus, if the statements are not selected, formulated
and assigned to the dimensions equitably, the composite score
will also be inaccurate. In this article, we evaluate the VAA
statements on criteria that can be directly measured and com-
pared in a quantitative way. We focus on the dimensionality
of the statements and assess whether the statements succeed
in discriminating/polarizing between the parties sufficiently.
Regarding dimensionality, two sub-criteria should be
considered. First, it is crucial that the statement taps into the
expected policy dimension – it has to align with the other
items that measure the same dimension. Violating this cri-
terion results in dimensional scales that do not meet basic
scalability requirements, and therefore, in spatial models that
misrepresent the differences between political parties (Otjes
and Louwerse, 2014: 264; 268–270). Second, the statements
should not tap into any other latent construct(s), that is, they
must be unidimensional. This criterion is breached, for
instance, when an issue-statement measures party position
on both the economic left–right and the cultural liberal-
conservative dimension. Such items tend to induce ambigu-
ity in the composite score and result in imprecise VAA
spatial maps. Therefore, the statements that are assigned to
indicate a certain policy dimension should be unidimen-
sional in their content (Germann et al., 2015).
Second, the statements should involve some contro-
versy, so that there are parties in favour as well as parties
against. VAA developers should not include so-called
valence issues, that is, issues on which (almost) the entire
electorate either agrees or disagrees (Garzia et al., 2017:
336). The other way a statement can fail in terms of suffi-
ciently discriminating between parties is if parties are
highly concentrated to the centre of the coding scale, tak-
ing a neutral or an unclear stance on an issue. To avoid
that, the statements should have high salience in the elec-
tion campaign, which makes it more likely for parties to
have a clear stance (ibid.). As De Sio and Weber (2014:
872) point out, there can be a large cross-national varia-
tion in policy support: An issue that is divisive in one
country can have almost unified support/opposition in
another context. The same applies to the salience of dif-
ferent topics. Thus, coming up with issue-statements that
are divisive and salient in all or most European party
systems can be considerably challenging.
It is crucial for VAA developers to ensure that the
dimensional scales they construct meet the aforementioned
criteria. In this study, we elaborate this argument and
demonstrate how statements that violate these conditions
can bias the placements of parties, depending on the latter’s
ideological inclinations.
The EUvox and euandi data sets
We utilize data from two pan-European VAAs developed
for the 2014 EP elections: EUvox and euandi. Both were
accessible to the citizens of all 28 EU member states and
use the same three-dimensional spatial model for placing
users and parties, consisting of economic left–right, cul-
tural liberal-traditional/conservative and pro/more-
against/less EU integration dimensions. To ensure data
comparability, we only analyse the placements of the 205
parties that were included in both VAAs.
Both VAAs employed five-point Likert-type scales as
statement answer categories – a party could be coded as
either in complete or partial (dis)agreement with the pro-
posed statement or as neutral. Both VAAs also have a ‘no
opinion’ option, used when parties do not have any stance on
a given issue. To make the interpretation of results more
convenient, the statements are scaled to range from 0 to 1:
Complete disagreement corresponds to ‘0’; complete agree-
ment to ‘1’; partial (dis)agreement to ‘0.25’ or ‘0.75’ and the
neutral position to ‘0.5’. The dimensions are scaled as fol-
lows: left–right: 0¼ left, 1¼ right; cultural: 0¼ liberal, 1¼
conservative/traditional and EU: 0 ¼ anti, 1 ¼ pro.
The dimension score of each party is the arithmetic
mean of its placement on all the statements that were
assigned to each respective dimension. If a party was coded
as having “no opinion” on a statement, this statement was
left out of the calculation for the respective party. Some
statement scores were reversed to ensure that each item has
the same polarity. As issue salience is not taken into
account, all statements have the same relative weight.
Although both EUvox and euandi use a questionnaire
with 30 issue-statements, the proportion of cross-national
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and country-specific statements differs. While euandi has a
questionnaire with 28 cross-national and two country-
specific statements, EUvox contains 21 items identical for
all countries and 9 country- or region-specific statements.
Replicating the original party placements in euandi was
simple, as they have clearly indicated which statements are
assigned to which dimension. According to the euandi web-
site, they use 27 of 28 cross-national statements in their
dimensional calculations and country-specific items are not
included. EUvox, conversely, has not explained how the
three-dimensional political space was calculated. Based
on information obtained from the developers of EUvox, it
appears that they used both the cross-national and country-
specific statements to calculate the dimensions and that
some items were removed in the countries where initial
user results proved that they do not align with the expected
dimension (indicating that the method of dynamic scale
validation was used; see Germann and Mendez, 2016 and
Germann et al., 2015). As we are conducting a cross-
national comparison, we use only the common statements
to calculate party positions. Consequently, the party place-
ments we use do not completely mirror the ones which
were visible to users after completing the 30-statement
EUvox survey. According to our information, 20 of 21
EUvox cross-national statements were at least initially used
in dimensional calculations.4 The statements used to calcu-
late the dimension scores and their respective polarities are
presented in the Online Appendix A.
There is also a difference between the party coding
methodologies of EUvox and euandi, as the former uses
the Kieskompas method, whereas the latter employs the
Delphi method. The general comparison of the two VAAs
is presented in Table 1.
Results and analyses
Overlap between EUvox and EUandi party
placements
We start by assessing the general overlap between the
EUvox and euandi party placements on the three political
dimensions. Figure 1 plots euandi placements (x-axis)
against EUvox placements (y-axis), each data point repre-
senting a political party. As Figure 1 indicates, party place-
ments are strongly and positively correlated on all
dimensions. However, clear differences in terms of the
Table 1. General comparison of euandi and Euvox.
Euandi EUvox
N of countries 28 28
N of parties 242 228




N of political dimensions 3 3




Party coding method Kieskompas
method
Delphi method
Source: EUvox and euandi, 2014.
Figure 1. Scatterplots of party placement convergence in euandi
and EUvox on left–right, cultural and EU dimensions.
Source: EUvox and euandi, 2014. EU: European Union.
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strength of correlation can also be observed. The linear
relationship is strongest on the cultural dimension (R2 ¼
0.71) and most of the data points are gathered closely
around the regression diagonal. On the EU dimension, most
parties are located on the pro-EU side of the scale in both
VAAs, and the parties’ EU dimension placement in one
VAA explains 70% of the variance in the positioning in
the other (R2 ¼ 0.70). On the left–right dimension, the
convergence between the placements in the two VAAs is
notably weaker than the two other scales (R2 ¼ 0.61).
It is possible that, although the party placement scores
correlate strongly, they are still systematically different.
Therefore, we also compare the mean dimensional scores
for the entire party set. Figure 2 demonstrates that the slight
differences in party placements tend to balance out, lacking
notable systematic inconsistencies. For some parties, the
euandi score is slightly more right-wing, conservative or
pro-EU than in EUvox, whereas for others it is the other
way around. Thus, when the average scores of the entire
party data sets for each dimension are compared, the high-
est statistically significant difference is on the economic
dimension: in EUvox, the parties are, on average, placed
4% more to the right than in euandi. On the EU dimension,
we can also detect a statistically significant divergence, as
in EUvox, the average score is almost 3% more pro-EU. On
the cultural axis, the average scores of the full party data
sets are almost indistinguishable, with the difference being
less than 2% and statistically insignificant.
The indicators presented on Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate
that the economic left–right dimension clearly has the low-
est degree of convergence between EUvox and euandi. On
the EU dimension, there is a statistically significant differ-
ence between the average placement of the parties, yet,
overall, the match between party placements is still very
high. The cultural dimension placements converge best
according to both indicators, as they have the strongest
correlation and no statistically significant difference in the
average placements of the party sets. This result is rather
surprising considering the findings of Otjes and Louwerse
(2014) which indicate that the liberal-conservative dimen-
sion performs rather weakly compared to the economic
dimension, in terms of scaling reliability. Although we
study the external validity of the two VAAs, while Otjes
and Louwerse analyse the internal coherence of the scales,
it is reasonable to expect that the two are correlated: If the
scales are less consistent internally, one would also assume
that the overlap with other VAA placements is lower,
unless both use invalid, but similar scales.
To provide a more detailed comparison of the party
placements in the two VAAs, we also examine the party
placement divergence for different party families to assess
whether some parties are more problematic for placement
in VAA generated spatial maps. We distinguish seven
party families, mostly based on their affiliations with EP
party groups and other international networks. The Online
Appendix B contains the lists of parties in each of the
groups and the exact classification criteria. To analyse the
convergence between EUvox and euandi placements
within party families, we compare the dimensional mean
scores, as we previously did for the whole party sample
(see Figure 2). The means comparison reveals whether
there is any systematic bias between the EUvox and
euandi placements among different party groups. Correla-
tion coefficients are not used for this analysis, as there is
significantly less variation within party families compared
to the whole party sample, which makes it difficult to
detect covariation.
Figure 3 depicts the two-dimensional political maps of
the average positions of party families in EUvox and
euandi. In the upper part of the figure, the left–right dimen-
sion is plotted against the cultural and on the lower part
against the EU axis. The ellipses represent the standard
deviations (SDs) of the party placements within each group
on both axes, with the average party group position located
in the centre of the ellipse. Figure 3 confirms that the most
divergent dimension between the two VAAs is the eco-
nomic one. EUvox gives a clearly more polarized percep-
tion of the European party landscape in terms of left–right
placements, as it puts the most right-wing party groups
more to the right, while placing radical left parties closer
to the left extreme. On a scale from 0 (left) to 1 (right), the
distance between the two furthest groups in euandi is 0.46
(far left parties are, on average, placed at 0.12; European
Conservatives and Reformists [ECR] parties at 0.58), while
in EUvox, it is 0.59 (far left at 0.06; liberals 0.65).
If for the whole party data set these differences almost
balance out, significantly higher discrepancies are visible
across party families on the economic dimension, as the
placement bias is not unidirectional across party groups:
Some groups are more right-wing in EUvox, while others
in euandi. In a nutshell, parties that are closer to the polit-
ical centre (centre-right (European People’s Party [EPP]),
centre-left (Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Demo-
crats [PES])5 and liberals (Alliance of Liberals and Demo-
crats for Europe [ALDE])), as well as green parties, have a
significantly more right-wing placement in EUvox,
whereas both populist right and radical left parties are sig-
nificantly more to the right in euandi. The largest difference
Figure 2. Mean dimensional scores of EUvox and euandi.
Source: EUvox and euandi, 2014.
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is observed among populist right and liberal parties, which
are both positioned 13% more to the right in euandi and
EUvox, respectively. Right-populist parties are the only
group for which the average placement is on different sides
of the centre-point in the two VAAs (left in EUvox and
right in euandi). For green parties, the divergence is over
10% as well, while centre-right and centre-left parties are
positioned slightly less than 10% more to the left in euandi
compared to EUvox. Altogether, six of seven party groups
have a statistically significant difference in their average
left–right placement. Since political parties are often
described as being either left- or right-wing, such discre-
pancies can cause notable confusion. For example, 8 of 41
centre-right (EPP) and 6 of 29 liberal (ALDE) parties are
positioned as economically left-wing in euandi, while
occupying a right-wing position in EUvox. Left-wing par-
ties, however, are consistently placed on the left side of the
political landscape.
Regarding the EU dimension, Figure 3 reveals that the
convergence between party family positions in the two
VAAs is generally much higher compared to the left–right
axis. Centre-left, liberal, green and centre-right party
Figure 3. Two-dimensional political landscapes in euandi and EUvox according to average party family placements. Note: The average
party positions are in the centres of the ellipses. The ellipses represent the SDs of party placements within groups. The width of the
ellipse indicates one SD on the economic left–right axes, while the height of the ellipse indicates one SD on the liberal-conservative/pro-
anti EU axis. SD: standard deviation; EU: European Union.
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families are placed conveniently at the pro-EU side of the
continuum in both VAAs, where they are usually presumed
to be. Right-populist and ECR parties are also positioned at
the expected against EU side in both applications, and pla-
cement divergence is almost non-existent. Very notable
outliers from this pattern of high convergence are far-left
parties which are, on average, 16% more pro-EU in EUvox.
This is the highest divergence in party family placements
across all three dimensions and is very problematic in sub-
stantive terms. While in EUvox, the average left-radical
party placement on EU dimension is precisely in the middle
of the axis (0.50), indicating a neutral take on EU integra-
tion, in euandi, the average placement is 0.34, which is
clearly an anti-EU position, not very distant from the Euro-
sceptic right-populist parties (average placement 0.24).
Finally, on the cultural dimension, the placements are
highly consistent across the two VAAs, the only exception
being ECR parties. As Figure 3 demonstrates, these parties
are significantly closer to the conservative endpoint of the
cultural scale in euandi. Such a discrepancy is rather sur-
prising, given that these parties often employ rigid conser-
vative positions and should not be too difficult to place on
this dimension. However, the problem is not very dramatic,
as most ECR parties are consistently placed on the conser-
vative side of the continuum in each VAA, corresponding
to the general intuition of where they should reside in the
political space.
In sum, the comparison of the EUvox and euandi data
sets reveals that both VAAs manage to place most parties
similarly and to the quadrants in the political space where
these parties are usually perceived to be. However, there is
still some confusion and systematic differences evident
(mostly on socio-economic left–right dimension), and this
finding cannot be overlooked.
Explaining the overlap and divergences in party
placements
This section deals with a more thorough focus into the
previously described findings, indicating that the lowest
convergence between the EUvox and euandi party place-
ments is on the economic dimension, while the highest is on
the cultural issue-dimension. As indicated in the introduc-
tion, we focus on the issue-statements used to calculate the
dimensional positions.
A first notable observation is that the statements
assigned to the cultural and EU dimensions are much more
similar between the two VAAs compared to the left–right
axis. On the cultural dimension, there are six survey items
that address the same or almost the same issue.6 These
statements concern cannabis/soft drugs legalization, same
sex marriage, abortion, immigration, citizen privacy and
punishment of criminals (see the Online Appendix A).
On the EU dimension, there are four items that address the
same or a very similar issue: Both VAAs have included a
statement about the euro currency; member state veto pow-
ers; common EU foreign policy, and a general statement on
whether EU integration is a good thing (euandi) or whether
EU membership has been bad for the country (EUvox).
Contrary to the other two dimensions, the economic left–
right positions are measured by almost entirely different
statements in both VAAs. The statement ‘Governments
should reduce workers’ protection regulations in order to
fight unemployment’ is included in euandi, while in
EUvox, a similar statement is framed as ‘It should be easy
for companies to fire people’. This goes closest to an item
overlap on the left–right dimension. Thus, we can con-
clude that there is a much higher degree of consensus
between the two VAA developers regarding which state-
ments best capture the cultural and the EU dimensions.
Regarding some similar statements, party placements
diverge due to formulation differences7 but, generally,
parties are coded very similarly on matching statements
in the two VAAs. Based on this, we can argue that the high
overlap between party placements on the cultural and
(slightly less) on the EU dimension can, at least partially,
be attributed to the similar items used by the two VAAs to
measure these constructs.
However, this addresses only one part of the empirical
puzzle, as it tells nothing about the systematic party place-
ment differences between the two VAAs – most notably on
the economic left–right dimension. If all the items success-
fully measure the same latent concept (while not tapping
into any other dimension) and manage to discriminate
between the parties sufficiently, it should not matter that
the specific content of the statements differs: Dimensional
party placements should still be similar. Thus, to uncover
what could cause the systematic differences between the
two VAAs, we single out statements that we deem to be in
violation of these criteria. Table 2 lists all the statements
that fail in terms of dimensionality or sufficient polariza-
tion between parties. Altogether, we have identified 10
suboptimal statements (6 in euandi and 4 in EUvox) of a
total of 47 (27 in euandi and 20 in EUvox).
To evaluate the performance of different statements
regarding dimensionality, we ran a principal component
analysis (PCA) with pairwise deletion (to avoid losing too
many cases due to missing codings) and varimax rotation.
In Table 2, we list the component loadings of the state-
ments on the expected dimension(s) and the highest loading
on any of the other two components (the loadings on each
dimension for all statements in both VAAs are presented in
the Online Appendix C). Following the suggestion of Hair
et al. (1998), we draw the threshold of a sufficient loading
coefficient at 0.4, considering that our sample size is
approximately 200. We have, therefore, singled out state-
ments that either have a loading of less than 0.4 on the
expected construct, have a loading of 0.4 or more on any
of the two other dimensions, or both.
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As Table 2 indicates, eight statements (five in euandi and
three in EUvox) have problems with dimensionality. Two
items are at odds with both sub-criteria by not loading suffi-
ciently on the expected dimension, while showing a signif-
icantly higher alignment with another component. The first
of these statements proposes that external loans are a good
solution to crisis situations – it is assigned to the economic
left–right dimension in EUvox. According to PCA, this
item aligns better with the EU dimension (component
loading 0.60), while falling short on the 0.4 criterion on
the left–right dimension (0.39). Another statement that
fails in terms of both dimensionality criteria concerns
Table 2. List of problematic statements in EUvox and euandi.















parties on the same






External loans from institutions
such as the IMF are a good
solution to crisis situations
EUvox Left–right 0.39 0.60 48% 0.30
It should be harder for EU
immigrants working or
staying in [your country] to
get access to social assistance




0.33/0.33 0.62 63% 0.36
To tackle the sovereign debt
crisis, the member states of
the Eurozone should be
allowed to issue common
bonds (Eurobonds)
euandi EU 0.58 0.51 48% 0.41
The EU should redistribute
resources from richer to
poorer EU regions
EUvox EU 0.54 0.52 74% 0.28
Less serious crimes should be
punished with community
service, not imprisonment
EUvox Cultural 0.44 0.48 68% 0.26
The promotion of public
transport should be fostered




0.34/0.35 0.21 58% 0.34
Renewable sources of energy
(e.g. solar or wind energy)
should be supported even if
this means higher energy costs
euandi Left–right and
cultural
0.31/0.34 0.32 55% 0.30
Restrictions of personal privacy
on the Internet should be
accepted for public security
reasons
euandi Cultural 0.38 0.25 75% 0.25
Pension benefits should be
reduced to limit the state
debt in [your country]
euandi Left–right 0.43 0.15 81% 0.26
Restrictions on citizen privacy
are acceptable in order to
combat crime
EUvox Cultural 0.60 0.14 56% 0.27
VAA: voting advice application; EU: European Union.
Note: All values that violate the criteria are marked in bold. The dimensionality of the statements was determined by a principal component analysis (with
pairwise deletion and varimax rotation) of all statements in euandi and EUvox (separately). Alignment with the expected dimension(s) indicates the
component loading on the dimension(s) the statement was assigned to; loading coefficients below 0.4 are considered as breaching the criterion;
regarding the unidimensionality criterion, we look at the highest component loading on any other dimension. Loading coefficients above 0.4 are
considered as breaching the unidimensionality criterion. The polarization criteria consist of a valence criterion, which is violated when 75% or more of
the parties are on the same side of the centre-point on a statement; and dispersion, which is measured by the standard deviation of party placements.
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access to welfare benefits of EU immigrants. This euandi
statement breaches the unidimensionality criterion already a
priori, as it is assigned to left–right and EU dimensions.
However, its loadings on the expected constructs are insuf-
ficient, whereas it aligns strongly with the items that capture
the parties’ cultural liberal-conservative position.
There are six more statements that violate one of the two
dimensionality criteria. As for undimensionality, the
EUvox statement on whether the EU should redistribute its
resources from richer to poorer countries and the euandi
statement proposing Eurobonds as an option to solve the
debt crisis load sufficiently on the expected EU dimension,
but are also attached to the left–right component, as left-
wing parties are more prone to agree to such proposals.
Somewhat surprisingly, the EUvox cultural dimension
statement regarding punishing criminals aligns too strongly
with EU issues. In this formulation, only right-populist
parties, on average, take the conservative (tougher punish-
ments) position on that issue, which probably causes the
violation in terms of unidimensionality, although the word-
ing does not suggest that the statement also measures atti-
tudes towards EU. Three statements do not align
sufficiently with any of the three dimensions. Two of these
items, both included in euandi, address green/ecological
issues. Regarding these items, the unidimensionality criter-
ion was, again, already a priori breached, as they are
assigned to both the economic and cultural dimensions.
This is a questionable decision, as green issues are usually
considered part of the cultural GAL-TAN dimension, and
there seems to be no clear reason to also include them in the
economic left–right calculation. However, the PCA indi-
cates that the two items do not load sufficiently on either
the economic or cultural component. Finally, the euandi
statement on Internet privacy restrictions narrowly misses
the 0.4 loading coefficient threshold on the cultural dimen-
sion, while not aligning with any other construct.
To assess whether statements polarize sufficiently
between parties, we lack such widely accepted benchmarks
as with dimensionality. Regarding the valence criterion, we
follow the approach of De Sio (2010) and De Sio and
Weber (2014) who contend that whether a specific political
issue in a given context can be considered as positional or
valence in its nature, should be determined on empirical
grounds, based on the level of support a particular policy
currently has among the population. Following the sugges-
tion of De Sio (2010), we drew the line of valence criterion
to 75%: If more than 75% of the party sample (which in our
study is the population) are on the same side regarding a
proposal, we consider that it breaches the valence criterion.
As Table 2 reveals, both VAAs have been quite successful
in avoiding valence issues: Just two statements (both in
euandi) of 47 have more than 75% of the whole party
sample on the same side (see the Online Appendix C for
the respective percentages of all statements). The most
clear-cut case of a valence criterion violation is the euandi
left–right dimension statement ‘Pension benefits should be
reduced to limit the state debt in [country]’; 81% of the
parties that have been coded on that issue completely dis-
agree (56%) or tend to disagree (25%) with the proposal,
while only 10% support it. A previously mentioned euandi
statement on Internet privacy restrictions also breaches the
threshold, as 75.3% of the coded parties are against the
proposition and only 12% support it. However, there is a
high amount of missing codings (25%) on this statement. If
the missing cases are included, the percentage of parties on
the ‘against’ side of the scale is much lower. Also consid-
ering that on this item the modal category is ‘tend to dis-
agree’, we find that the ‘internet privacy’ statement is
actually more problematic in terms of dispersion, not the
valence criterion.
As for the condition of sufficient dispersion between
parties, we compare the SDs on each statement. Euandi
coders have more frequently used complete agreement/dis-
agreement categories, making the average SD higher in
euandi (0.35, compared to 0.31 in EUvox).8 Although we
lack a particular benchmark, several items clearly stand out
(see the SDs of all statements in the Online Appendix C).
Unsurprisingly, the SD of the pension reduction statement
is very low (0.26), as most parties are strongly against the
proposal. However, the SD of the previously mentioned
Internet privacy statement is even lower: 0.25 – the lowest
value among the 47 statements. A very similar statement in
EUvox (‘Restrictions on citizen privacy are acceptable
in order to combat crime’) also has one of the lowest SDs
in the whole sample (0.27) and is listed as problematic in
terms of dispersion, although it manages to meet all other
criteria. Only 3% of the parties in EUvox completely agree
with restricting privacy and 14% are completely against
this proposition, while 83% of the parties are placed into
the three middle categories (no other statement in either
VAA has less parties in the complete dis(agreement) cate-
gories). Thus, although the Internet privacy issue is highly
salient, it is difficult to determine the party positions on the
topic. A similar problem is evident with the EUvox state-
ment on punishing criminals. It has an SD of 0.26, 21% of
parties have been coded as ‘neutral’ (highest value in the
sample) and 79% are in the three middle categories.
To elaborate on the difference between the valence and
dispersion criteria, we briefly discuss five other statements –
all concerning European integration/EU issues – that come
very close to violating the valence criteria, as 72–74% of the
parties are on one side of the scale (see the Online Appendix
C). Substantively, there is not much difference whether a
statement is supported/rejected by 74% or 75% of the party
sample, yet the situation regarding these statements is actu-
ally different compared to the ones described in the two
previous paragraphs. Statements like ‘On foreign policy
issues the EU should speak with one voice’ or ‘Overall,
EU membership has been a bad thing for (Country)’ divide
parties asymmetrically, as most are on the pro-EU side of the
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continuum, but still invoke polarization. Although fewer in
number than the pro-EU camp, there is a considerable
amount of parties that take a strong anti-EU stance (i.e.
complete (dis)agreement with the proposal). These parties
usually belong to the right-populist group, but the average
placement of far-left and ECR parties is usually also on the
anti-EU side. On the ‘pension reduction’ and ‘internet pri-
vacy’ statements, we do not see such systematic polarization,
as no party family consistently occupies the more unpopular
side (supporting pension cuts and privacy restrictions) of the
scale. This difference is reflected in the SDs, which are much
higher for these EU statements (see the Online Appendix C).
Thus, these statements meet the polarization criteria,
although there is a clear majority of parties that are suppor-
tive of European integration.
In sum, Table 2 demonstrates that there are problematic
statements in both VAAs and on all three dimensions.
However, two observations indicate that these flawed items
affect mostly the convergence between EUvox and euandi
on the left–right dimension. First, there is a clear imbalance
between the two VAAs in terms of problematic statements
on the left–right dimension: in euandi, there are four, while
in EUvox only one left–right item that violates any of the
outlined criteria. This suggests that the euandi left–right
placements might be more inaccurate, which also corre-
sponds to the observations from the previous section –
several parties that are usually perceived to be right-wing
are placed as left-wing in euandi. On the cultural dimen-
sion, the ratio of problematic statements is 3 in euandi to 2
in EUvox, and on the EU dimension, it is 2 to 1, respec-
tively. Second, the statements that are most gravely in vio-
lation of the dimensionality and polarization criteria are all
assigned to the economic dimension. Subsequently, we
demonstrate how these statements distort party placements
depending on party ideology.
Figure 4 displays the average party family placements
on the two euandi left–right statements which constitute the
most vivid examples of violating the two main criteria we
have outlined: dimensionality and polarization. The state-
ment ‘It should be harder for EU immigrants working or
staying in (country) to get access to social assistance ben-
efits than it is for (country’s) citizens’ is assigned to both
left–right and EU dimensions and supporting this proposal
moves the party towards the right and anti-EU poles. How-
ever, in reality, the statement aligns best with the liberal-
conservative component. Problems with dimensionality
seem to derive from the formulation of the statement, as
it bundles together too many different ideological attitudes
by mentioning the EU, immigrants and social benefits in
one sentence. As Figure 4 demonstrates, only the two most
conservative and Eurosceptic party groups – right-populists
and ECR – are supportive of such measure, thus obtaining a
right-wing position on that item. Centre-left, far left, green
and liberal (ALDE) parties are gathered into the most leftist
quarter of the scale, while centre-right parties are also posi-
tioned left-of-centre. The two groups that diverge from
their average euandi left–right position most are right-
populist (overall left–right mean score of 0.55; mean score
on that issue 0.83) and liberals (0.52 and 0.25). It appears
that the right-populist’s strong support for such a proposal
rather expresses the anti-immigrant and anti-EU views of
those parties, while the clearly left-wing stance of ALDE
parties probably stems from the socially liberal ideology
that is generally supportive of universal rights. This is an
example of why it is important that statements do not mea-
sure any other latent construct except the one they are
supposed to measure. We urge VAA developers to not
assign one statement to several ideological dimensions
simultaneously and leave multidimensional statements out
of the dimensional calculations.
The second statement displayed on Figure 4 demon-
strates how breaching the valence criterion can distort party
positions. Parties are clearly very reluctant to support pen-
sion reductions and all party families are on the left side of
Figure 4. Average party family placements on two problematic euandi left–right statements. Note: FL – far/radical left, G – greens, SD –
centre-left, L – liberals (ALDE), EPP – centre-right, ECR – conservatives/eurosceptics and RP – right-populist/far right.
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the scale. Differentiation between parties is very small, as
the most leftist party family (far left) is placed at 0.06,
while the most ‘rightist’ group (EPP) is at 0.27. No other
statement in either VAA has all seven party families gath-
ered in such a short segment of the continuum. This state-
ment, again, has a stronger distorting effect on the
presumably right-wing parties that are pushed significantly
towards the left in the composite score. It remains ques-
tionable whether all party families have really taken a very
similar and leftist stance on the pension issue, or if the
statement was simply composed in a suboptimal way. We
tend to incline towards the latter option. Possibly, just
reversing the statement (propose increasing the pension
benefits instead of reducing) could bring out the ideological
differences between parties more clearly. In sum, the two
statements displayed in Figure 4 significantly distort the
placements of especially centre-right (EPP) and liberal
(ALDE) parties, pushing them towards the left side of the
continuum in euandi calculations.
To test whether problematic/flawed statements are
responsible for the divergences between EUvox and euandi
party placements, we recalculated all the placements with-
out the items brought out in Table 2. Indeed, the recalcula-
tions show a significant increase in convergence between
EUvox and euandi placements on the left–right dimension,
mostly on the account of presumably right-wing parties
moving more to the right in euandi (see the Online Appen-
dix D for the comparison of the initial and modified
dimensional calculations). For the whole party sample,
the 4% bias has been reduced to 1%, with the difference
being statistically insignificant. For centre-right parties,
the 9% bias disappears completely, and the divergence
of liberal parties is now also much less severe, as only a
5% discrepancy remains, compared to the initial 13. For
radical left parties, the 6% bias has decreased to 0 and for
the populist right from 13% to 9%. The difference has also
decreased for green and centre-left parties, yet not signif-
icantly. Moreover, the correlation between EUvox and
euandi placements for the whole party sample is now
much stronger, as the R2 has increased to 0.72, compared
to the initial 0.61 (see Figure 1). On the cultural and EU
dimensions, removing the problematic statements does
not cause such significant changes in convergence
between the two VAAs. In fact, on the cultural dimension,
the difference between the placements increases, although
not substantially. The correlation between the placements
remains roughly the same on other two dimensions after
the recalculation. These results again suggest that the high
overlap especially on the cultural dimension owes much to
a similarity in the items used to measure the concept,
whereas the systematic differences on the left–right pla-
cements seem to be mostly the result of some suboptimal
statements included in the calculations.
Eventually, there is confusion regarding just one party
group on one dimension in terms of which side of the
centre-point it should be placed: right-populist parties on
the left–right dimension. Even after removing the proble-
matic statements, the average placement of this group
remains left-of-centre in EUvox and right-of-centre in
euandi, with nearly a 10% gap between the VAAs (see the
Online Appendix D). Another very significant difference in
party placements that also remains after the recalculations
pertains to far-left parties on the EU dimension: in euandi,
these parties are now placed as even more Eurosceptic
(0.26), while in EUvox, the average position is 17% more
towards the centre-point of the scale (0.43), indicating just
a mildly negative attitude towards the EU. The similarity
between these two party groups is that both seem to have an
issue-based approach towards the respective dimensions.
For example, populist right parties support increasing the
taxation on bank and stock market gains and relaxing EU
austerity policy – leftist policy proposals. On the other
hand, they also support cutting government spending and
reducing the number of public sector employees, while
being against maintaining social programmes at the cost
of higher taxes – all rightist policy stances. This indicates
that right-populist parties lack a coherent economic policy
and seem to be approaching each issue separately, aiming
to resonate with public opinion. This finding conforms to
some previous research that has shown how populist right
parties rely on a strategy of issue ‘blurring’ (see Rovny,
2013) to appeal to as many voters as possible (de Lange,
2007). As for left-radical parties, their issue-based
approach to European integration appears to be more ideo-
logically motivated and does not necessarily correspond to
the public opinion. For example, these parties are firmly
against common EU foreign and defence policies, while
supporting distribution of resources from richer to poorer
EU regions and the workers’ right to work in other EU
countries. Thus, it is evident that because of such issue-
based approach, it is difficult to place right-populist parties
on the left–right and far-left parties on the EU dimension,
using VAA party placement methodology.
Discussion
The results presented in this article reveal that, overall, the
two cross-national VAAs – EUvox and euandi – have man-
aged to place more than 200 parties from 28 EU countries
in a highly similar way on each of the three main issue-
dimensions structuring European politics. However, we
also found some systematic divergence between the two
applications, which is mostly evident on the economic
left–right dimension and particularly with regard to right-
wing parties. We demonstrated that such divergences are
largely caused by suboptimal statements that violate the
dimensionality criteria or do not manage to polarize suffi-
ciently between parties. Excluding these problematic state-
ments significantly improves the party placement
convergence. This indicates that if statements are selected
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and coded appropriately, different VAAs place most of the
parties in the European political space consistently, even if
the specific content of the issue-statements differs. The
only notable divergences in placement that remain even
after removing the problematic items from the calculations
pertain to right-populist parties on the left–right and far-left
parties on the pro-anti-EU dimension. Due to the issue-
based approach of these parties, it is genuinely difficult
to place them on these dimensions of political competition,
suggesting that, in this case, VAA developers are not to
blame for the divergence of party positioning.
These findings corroborate with Germann et al. (2015)
and Germann and Mendez (2016) who advocate for the use
of dynamic scale validation based on the early user data to
improve the quality of VAA spatial maps after the initial
tool launch. However, regarding cross-national VAAs, we
would suggest that the scales are validated before the appli-
cation is launched to the wider public, using the party pla-
cements on all issue-statements. Validating national VAAs
in such way would not be feasible due to the small number
of parties, but with data of over 200 European parties, one
could implement basic statistical procedures to detect items
that do not meet the criteria and distort the scales. It would
have been possible to exclude the problematic statements
that we singled out in this article, based on party-level data.
Regarding cross-national comparison, it would be better if
the validation is performed on the entire VAA party data,
not separately in each country.
Finally, our findings show that VAAs should not only be
considered as educational tools, but also as a legitimate and
accurate method of party placement on the underlying ideo-
logical dimensions structuring party systems. EUvox and
euandi have provided a reliable estimate of where parties
stand in a cross-national EU-wide political space. Both
VAAs have managed to position most of the parties where
they are usually perceived to be, in terms of economic left–
right standpoints, cultural/moral values and pro/anti-EU
stances. To provide additional proof of the accuracy of
these party placements, future research could compare
EUvox and euandi positions with other more established
measures of party placements, such as expert surveys, dif-
ferent methods of manifesto coding, public opinion data
aggregation and parliamentary roll-call votes (see Krouwel,
2012). As the VAA method is clearly distinct from all other
approaches, it can provide a valuable addition into the
debate over the validity and reliability of different party
positioning methods. We see no reason for VAAs not to
be considered among the most prominent methodologies to
estimate party positions and as measures to analyse party
competition in multidimensional issue-spaces.
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Notes
1. Data set available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.7802/1594
2. Data set available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.12138
3. The wording differs slightly also in the two voting advice appli-
cations under study in this article: euandi calls it the liberal-
traditional and EUvox liberal-conservative dimension.
4. In both euandi and EUvox, the one cross-national statement
that was not used in dimensional calculations addressed the
issue of whether new European Union treaties should be
subject to a referendum in a member state.
5. S&D is the European Parliament party group of the Party of
European Socialists (PES). PES member parties which have
not gained seats in the EP are also included in this group (see
Appendix B).
6. Which is a very high number, considering that altogether there
were 7 cultural dimension statements in EUvox and 11 in euandi.
7. Mostly regarding the statements addressing citizen privacy,
punishing criminals and common European Union foreign
policy.
8. As suggested by earlier work of Gemenis and van Ham (2014)
on Dutch voting advice applications, this could derive from the
different coding procedures (Kieskompas method in euandi
and Delphi method in EUvox), but this topic falls out of the
scope of this article.
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